How ‘dead’ man Mohammed Sinwar planned October 7 Israel attacks by Hamas

A ‘dead’ man is the mastermind behind deadly attacks by terror group Hamas, an Israeli intelligence agency has admitted.

On July 27, 2014, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) stated that senior Hamas leader Mohammed Sinwar had been killed in an airstrike on a residential complex on July 27, 2014, along with more than a dozen other Hamas figures and their families.

The IDF’s “Operation Protective Edge” was a punitive attack targeting the Hamas leadership in the Gaza Strip following an escalation of violence following the killing of three hitchhiking Jewish teenagers in the West Bank. The seven-week conflict, in July and August 2014, resulted in the deaths of 67 Israeli soldiers and six civilians, along with 2,200 Palestinian deaths.

But Mohammed Sinwar is still alive, the IDF indirectly admitted in a weekend statement.

He is the youngest brother of Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar. And Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant declared Yahya a “dead man walking” just days before the unveiling.

An IDF tweet announced that its forces raided a Hamas military post and training post on Saturday, killing 30 Hamas fighters.

Inside, “the soldier searched the office of Mohammed Sinwar, the brother of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, where military doctrine documents were located.”

Analysts immediately realized that Mohammed Sinwar would be dead.

Hamas “admitted” to Sinwar’s death in 2014 and released a photo showing his body on a bloodstained bed. Israel pointed out that the killing proves the success of its “targeted” attack on Gaza.

The IDF now accuses Sinwar of directing Hamas’ subsequent tunnel operations and rocket attacks – something the deadly Operation Protective Edge was intended to prevent.

“He was 100 percent part of the core team that planned October 7,” a former Mossad counterterrorism chief said yesterday.

Analysts at the US Military Academy West Point say such deception is something the intelligence community should be aware of. And they must be willing to challenge their own beliefs.

“Fighting terrorism requires intelligence agencies to confront biases, combat complacency, and think creatively about the evolving nature of terrorist attacks and how, when, and why terrorist organizations will deploy a range of tactics in the future,” write academics at the Modern Warfare Institute .

Failure of intelligence

Controversial Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lashed out at his military and intelligence chiefs after Hamas militants struck deep in his country on October 7. About 1,200 Israelis (including 318 soldiers, 59 police officers and about 800 civilians) were killed in the surprise attack.

In a since-deleted social media post, his office stated: “Under no circumstances and at no time was Prime Minister Netanyahu warned of war intentions on the part of Hamas. On the contrary, the assessment of the entire security echelon, including the head of military intelligence and the head of Shin Bet, was that Hamas had been deterred and was seeking a settlement.”

But Egypt says its intelligence services called Prime Minister Netanyahu in September to warn that Hamas was planning “something big.” US intelligence agencies also warned Capitol Hill of “unusual” Hamas activity in the months before the attack.

And now it appears that the bloody seven-week Operation Protective Edge campaign of 2014 was not as successful as estimated.

“The scale of the failure of Israel’s intelligence services is almost as shocking as the brutality and success of the Hamas attack itself on October 7,” the military academy’s assessment of the disaster reads.

“Israeli security officials likely made three critical mistakes… Israel misjudged Hamas’s capabilities and intentions – as well as its own defense capabilities.”

Dogma colored glasses

One of the key failures of the Israeli government appears to have been overconfidence and complacency, the MWI article said.

“Denial and deception activities aim to mislead intelligence operations, including by spoofing intelligence channels with disinformation,” the analysts claim.

Hamas encouraged “the public perception that it was unwilling to engage in combat or confrontation with Israel as it prepared for this massive operation.”

And Hamas has adopted enhanced operational security tactics in response to Israel’s “targeted assassinations.” Agents are known to have communicated for two years via direct cable networks rolled out through the tunnels under Gaza, avoiding commercial telecommunications systems and bypassing Israel’s hi-tech interception operations.

“As a result, Hamas was apparently able to secretly prepare the October 7 attack without arousing Israeli suspicion,” the IWM assessment said.

Nevertheless, there were indications that an attack was in the making.

“There were some worrying indicators,” the military academy academics said. “Why were they fired? It makes you wonder how dark the clouds were before the storm.”

A likely culprit is confirmation bias. This leads analysts and politicians to “undervalue or ignore evidence that contradicts early judgments and value evidence that tends to confirm pre-existing assessments.”

While written before Mohammed Sinwar’s revelation, the MWI analysts warned that Israeli military intelligence and the government had underestimated Hamas’s capabilities. “Israeli leaders and other observers are well aware that Tehran has been increasing aid in support of Hamas for years. Nevertheless, Israel has clearly underestimated how much such resources have strengthened Hamas’ current military capabilities and command and control.”